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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Jon Thomas Damian asserts the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress.
Mindful of the applicable authorities, Mr. Damian asserts the stop of his van was unlawful.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
According to the district court's findings of fact in its Order Re Motion to Suppress and
Restitution: "Officer Tiner was working as a patrol officer for the Boise City Police. He was
parked on Orchard Street when he saw a blue van traveling westbound on Cassia Street come to
a stop at the intersection with Orchard and then make a northbound tum." (R., p.71.) The
officer "testified that the van did not signal to tum and so he decided to follow the blue van."
(R., p.71.)

Officer Tiner "subsequently saw it straddle a lane as it turned westbound from

Orchard to Franklin Street turning into the left, or center, westbound lane of Franklin," and then
"saw the van signal to the right and immediately merge[] out of the center lane." (R., pp.71-72.)
Officer Tiner "activated his lights and stopped the blue van on Franklin." (R., p.72.)
Mr. Damian was driving the van and provided his driver's license.

(R., p.72.)

"Dispatch

informed Officer Tiner that Mr. Damian was wanted on a warrant," and the officer "conducted a
search of Mr. Damian incident to arrest and discovered methamphetamine and a pipe in
Mr. Damian's pocket." (R., p.72.)
The State charged Mr. Damian by Information with possession of a controlled substance,
felony, LC. § 37-2732(c), and possession of drug paraphernalia, misdemeanor, LC. § 37-2734A.
(R., pp.24-25.) Mr. Damian entered a not guilty plea to the charges. (See R., p.30.)
Mr. Damian later filed a Motion to Suppress, asserting he "and the vehicle he was driving
were illegally stopped and seized without reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe that
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a crime had been committed and that one of the occupants of the vehicle committed that crime,”
in violation of his “rights under Article I, Section 13 and 17 of the Constitution of the State of
Idaho, and under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, Section 1, to the Constitution of the
United States of America.” (R., pp.39-41.) He asserted, “Because the seizure of the Defendant
was not supported by reasonable articulable suspicion, or probable cause, all evidence derived
from the seizure of the Defendant must be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree.” (R., pp.3940.)
In his Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress, Mr. Damian asserted
Officer Tiner did not have reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop because
Mr. Damian’s driving conduct fell within the broad range of normal driving behaviors.
(R., p.44.) Mr. Damian believed “the evidence at hearing will show that he did use his turn
signal properly before turning from Cassia onto Orchard, and that Tiner was mistaken in
believing he did not.” (R., p.44.) He also believed “that his tires were not on or over the dotted
line while making the turn from Orchard onto Franklin, and that Tiner was mistaken in believing
that they were.” (R., p.44.)
Further, Mr. Damian asserted “his action in turning west onto Franklin from Orchard, and
then signaling immediately before changing lanes, was necessary for him to access the Fred
Meyer located at that intersection and was within the broad range of normal driving behaviors.”
(R., p.44.) He asserted, “The Idaho Court of Appeals has long held that conduct falling within
the broad range of normal driving behavior does not give rise to reasonable suspicion.” (R., p.44
(citing State v. Emory, 119 Idaho 661, 664 (Ct. App. 1991)). According to Mr. Damian: “With
respect to the second failure to signal for 100 feet prior to turning right into the Fred Meyer . . .
this was impossible for someone turning left onto Franklin from Orchard. That driver would
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need to indicate a left turn to negotiate the intersection, and once in the intersection, the right
turn into Fred Meyer is less than 100 feet away." (R., p.44.)
Moreover, Mr. Damian asserted: "There are many locations in this city where several
possible turns exist within a 100-foot distance.

To require an automatic 100-foot signaling

distance in all situations would require drivers to turn on their signals and then pass several turns
before making their desired turn." (R., p.44.) He asserted, "This would not provide notice to
others that the driver was turning as the statute is designed to do, but would rather confuse other
drivers into thinking that [the] driver was unaware his turn signal was on since he passed so
many turns." (R., pp.44-45.) Thus, Mr. Damian's "actions with respect to this signal [were] in
the broad range of normal driving behavior." (R., p.45.)
The State filed a State's Objection to Defendant's Motion to Suppress, argumg
Mr. Damian's three actions at issue "all give rise to reasonable, articulable suspicion that the
defendant was violating traffic laws." (R., pp.48-52.) The State also contended that, even if
Officer Tiner did not have reasonable, articulable suspicion for the traffic stop, the attenuation
doctrine exception to the exclusionary rule applied because the pre-existing valid arrest warrant
was a significant intervening factor that made exclusion of the evidence inappropriate. (See
R., p.51 (citing Utah v. Striejf, 136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016).)
The district court conducted a hearing on the motion to suppress, where Mr. Damian and
Officer Tiner testified.

(See R., pp.65-66.) Mr. Damian also presented four video clips of

footage taken from a neighbor's surveillance system, and testified the footage reflected his
driving pattern as he was turning onto Cassia from Orchard, including his turn signal blinking
clearly. (See Def Ex. A; Tr., p.16, L.21 -p.31, L.2.) 1 Mr. Damian asserted the traffic stop was

1

All citations to "Tr." refer to the transcript of the August 14, 2018, motion to suppress hearing.
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unlawful, and attenuation would not apply to save the evidence from the exclusionary rule. (See
Tr., p.61, L.11 – p.64, Ls.12.)
The district court subsequently issued an Order Re Motion to Suppress and Restitution.
(R., pp.71-77.) The district court determined that “Officer Tiner testified credibly that he saw
Mr. Damian pull onto Orchard from Cassia without signaling.” (R., p.74.) While Mr. Damian
testified “that he signaled properly when turning out of Cassia,” and also presented video
evidence showing a vehicle turning onto Orchard from Cassia with the rear turn signal visible
and activated, the district court determined “the video clips do not show what Officer Tiner saw
that night.” (R., p.74.) Per the district court, “They do not show whether the front turn signal of
Mr. Damian’s van—the signal visible to Officer Tiner—was activated.” (R., p.74.)
Next, the district court determined:

“Officer Tiner testified that he observed that

Mr. Damian, while driving on Orchard and Franklin, twice failed to maintain his lane.
Mr. Damian argues that he did not leave his lane. Officer’s Tiner’s testimony was credible.”
(R., p.74.)
Further, “Officer Tiner testified that Mr. Damian changed lanes too soon after turning
onto Franklin and too soon after beginning to signal left.” (R., p.74.) The district court noted,
“Mr. Damian does not dispute the timing of his signal or merge but argues that some of the
entrances to the Fred Meyer parking lot are only fifty or sixty feet from the intersection and so he
did not have more time to merge or signal.” (R., pp.74-75.) The district court explained the
conduct at issue in Emory “that the officer used to justify his stop was that the car delayed at the
traffic light for five to six seconds,” which was “not a violation of law and does fall ‘within the
broad range of what can be described as normal driving behavior.’” (R., p.75 (quoting Emory,
119 Idaho at 664).) The district court determined that, in contrast, “Mr. Damian violated a traffic
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statute, Idaho Code Section 49-808(2), which is a violation oflaw." (R., p.75.) Thus, the district
court determined:

"Whether Mr. Damian was charged or prosecuted is not relevant.

The

violation of the traffic law provides the basis for the stop." (R., p.75.)
The district court therefore determined:

"When viewed under the totality of the

circumstances at the time of the stop, Officer Tiner had a reasonable and articulable suspicion
that the vehicle was being driven contrary to traffic laws. Officer Tiner pulled over Mr. Damian
for three traffic violations. Any of the three reasons was sufficient. The stop was justified."
(R., p.76.) The district court denied the motion to suppress. 2 (R., p.76.)

Pursuant to a conditional plea agreement which preserved his right to appeal the district
court's denial of his motion to suppress, Mr. Damian agreed to plead guilty to possession of a
controlled substance. (See R., pp.79-86.) The district court imposed a unified sentence of three
years, with one year fixed, suspended the sentence, and placed Mr. Damian on probation for a
period of three years. (R., pp.89-96.)
Mr. Damian filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court's Judgment of
Conviction, Suspended Sentence and Order of Probation. (R., pp.99-102.)

2

The State had also filed a Motion for Cost, related to the State's payment for the presence of
Officer Tiner at a hearing which ultimately was not held because Mr. Damian did not appear.
(R., pp.59-60.) The district court, after observing, "No rule in the Idaho Criminal Rules directly
authorizes the State to be reimbursed for the cost of having its witness present," denied the
motion for cost "in an exercise of this Court's discretion." (R., p.76.)
5

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Damian's motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Damian's Motion To Suppress

A.

Introduction
Mr. Damian asserts the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress, because

the stop of his van was unlawful. Thus, the evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop
should have been suppressed.

B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of review for a motion to suppress is bifurcated. An appellate court defers

to the trial court's fmdings of fact unless the findings are clearly erroneous, and freely reviews
the trial court's application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. Hankey,
134 Idaho 844, 846 (2000). "Findings of fact are not clearly erroneous if they are supported by
substantial and competent evidence. Decisions regarding the credibility of witnesses, weight to
be given to conflicting evidence, and factual inferences to be drawn are also within the discretion
of the trial court." State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 810 (2009) (internal citation omitted).

C.

The Stop OfMr. Damian's Van Was Unlawful
Mr. Damian asserts the stop of his van was unlawful. The Fourth Amendment to the

United States Constitution and Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution, prohibit
unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Idaho Const. art. I, § 17. Evidence
obtained in violation of these constitutional protections generally may not be used as evidence
against the victim of the illegal government action. See Bishop, 146 Idaho at 810-11; State v.

Koivu, 152 Idaho 511 (2012). This exclusionary rule "applies to evidence obtained directly from
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the illegal government action and to evidence discovered through the exploitation of the original
illegality, or the fruit of the poisonous tree.” See Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811.
“Any warrantless search or seizure of a citizen is presumptively unreasonable unless if
falls within certain specific and well-delineated exceptions.” Halen v. State, 136 Idaho 829, 833
(2002). “When a warrantless search or seizure is challenged by the defendant, the State bears the
burden to show that a recognized exception to the warrant requirement is applicable.” Id.
“Traffic stops constitute seizures under the Fourth Amendment.” State v. Henage, 143
Idaho 655, 658 (2007). However, because a traffic stop is limited in scope and duration, it is
analogous to an investigative detention and is analyzed under the principles set forth in Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). State v. Stewart, 145 Idaho 641, 644 (Ct. App. 2008). “Limited
investigatory detentions are permissible when justified by an officer’s reasonable articulable
suspicion that a person has committed, or is about to commit, a crime.” State v. Morgan, 154
Idaho 109, 112 (2013). “Reasonable suspicion must be based on specific, articulable facts and
the rational inferences that can be drawn from those facts.”
omitted).

Id. (internal quotation marks

“Reasonable suspicion requires more than a mere hunch or inchoate and

unparticularized suspicion.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “The test for reasonable
suspicion is based on the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at or before the time
of the stop.” Id.
Thus, a traffic stop is justified where “the officer has reasonable suspicion that a driver
has committed an offense, such as a traffic offense . . . .” State v. Neal, 159 Idaho 439, 442
(2015). Idaho Code § 49-637 provides that, “Whenever any highway has been divided into two
(2) or more clearly marked lanes for traffic . . . [a] vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable
entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from that lane until the driver has first
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ascertained that the movement can be made with safety.” I.C. § 49-637(1). Idaho Code § 49808 provides that, “No person shall turn a vehicle onto a highway or move a vehicle right or left
upon a highway or merge onto or exit from a highway unless and until the movement can be
made with reasonable safety nor without giving an appropriate signal.”

I.C. § 49-808(1).

Section 49-808 also provides: “A signal of intention to turn or move right or left when required
shall be given continuously to warn other traffic. On controlled-access highways and before
turning from a parked position, the signal shall be given continuously for not less than five (5)
seconds and, in all other instances, for not less than the last one hundred (100) feet traveled by
the vehicle before turning.” I.C. § 49-808(2).
Mindful of the above authorities on traffic violations and on appellate court deference to
the district court’s findings of fact and credibility determinations regarding motions to suppress,
Mr. Damian asserts the stop of his van was unlawful. (See R., p.44.) Thus, Mr. Damian submits
there was no basis for the officer to have reasonable suspicion that he had committed a traffic
offense. See Neal, 159 Idaho at 442. The stop of Mr. Damian’s van was therefore unlawful. See
Halen, 136 Idaho at 833.
The stop of Mr. Damian’s van was unlawful, and the evidence obtained as a result of the
traffic stop should have been suppressed. The district court erred when it denied Mr. Damian’s
motion to suppress.
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CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Mr. Damian respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district
court's judgment of conviction and order of probation, and the order which denied his motion to
suppress, and remand the case to the district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 23 rd day of May, 2019.

Isl Ben P. McGreevy
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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